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Is Sex-Selective Abortion Against the Law? 
Kate Greasley* 
Abstract—The paper addresses the legal status of ‘sex-selective’ abortion in 
British law. It argues, firstly, that abortions for which knowledge of fetal sex 
is a ‘but for’ cause can be lawful under the terms of the Abortion Act 1967, so 
long as one of the physical or mental health grounds in section 1 of the Act is 
attested to in good faith by two medical professionals. The failure of 
governmental and health bodies to correctly state the law pertaining to sex-
selective abortion in recent years owes in part to the failure to distinguish the 
legal grounds for abortion from the factual explanations for abortion, a 
distinction which, I argue, is essential for understanding the structure of 
Britain’s abortion law. The paper also considers the claim that abortions 
carried out partly for reasons of fetal sex are unlawful, or if not, ought to be 
legally prohibited, because of reasonable doubts about patient consent. It 
points out some key ways in which this consent-based objection is difficult to 
square with our general abortion permissions. 
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1. Introduction 
In February 2012, the Daily Telegraph newspaper published the details of a scandal 
it had claimed to unearth by conducting sting operations in a number of British 
abortion clinics.1 Equipped with secret cameras, reporters from the newspaper 
visited the clinics accompanied by actors who posed as women desiring terminations. 
In the process of the consultation, the female actors revealed to the abortion 
providers that they had decided on an abortion after discovering the sex of the fetus. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Stowell Junior Research Fellow in Law, University College, Oxford. Correspondence to: 
kate.greasley@univ.ox.ac.uk. Unless otherwise stated, all URLs were last accessed 21 June 2015. 
Thanks are owed to Carol Sanger, Sally Sheldon, Ellie Lee, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful 
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1Holly Watt, Claire Newell, Zahra Khimji, ‘Available on demand – an abortion if it’s a boy you 
wanted; Special Investigation on The Consultations. Sex-selection terminations are illegal, but clinics 
show willingness to carry them out’, Daily Telegraph 23 February p4-5 at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/9099925/Abortioninvestigation-Available-on-
demand-an-abortion-if-its-a-boy-you-wanted.html.  
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Although most of the clinics subsequently refused the termination, some private 
providers agreed to perform them notwithstanding the admitted relevance of fetal 
sex in the woman’s decision-making. Upon publication of the story, government 
officials rushed to denounce sex-selective abortion as immoral and to affirm the 
illegality of the practice. Andrew Lansley, the then Secretary of State for Health, 
responded to the Telegraph’s investigation with the following comments: 
 
Carrying out an abortion on the grounds of gender alone is in my view 
morally repugnant. It is also illegal. Whatever an individual’s opinion on 
abortion,…abortion laws are decided by Parliament, not by individual doctors. 
If some professionals disagree with the law as it stands they should argue their 
case for change. Simply flouting them in a belief that they know better is 
unacceptable.2 
 
Lansley subsequently announced that the health watchdog Care Quality 
Commission would be carrying out a series of unannounced inspections on abortion 
clinics across the country, to ensure compliance with the ‘spirit and letter of the law’ 
of abortion. In addition, two abortion clinic workers named in the Telegraph piece 
were referred to the police for possible criminal investigation.3 Despite the fact that 
the CQC returned no evidence about the practice of abortion for reasons of fetal sex,4 
the matter of sex-selective termination continued to attract political interest in the 
following years, culminating, in November 2014, with the introduction of a Private 
Member’s Bill intended to expressly ban abortions motivated by fetal sex.5 The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!Andrew Lansley, ‘Health professionals must not think they know better than the law’, Daily 
Telegraph 24 February 2012. 
3"After a lengthy investigation of the two doctors, the Crown Prosecution Service decided, in 
September 2013, not to advance the prosecution. A subsequent attempt made by an anti-abortion 
activist to bring a private prosecution under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act was also 
halted, although a General Medical Council ‘fitness to practice’ investigation is ongoing for one of the 
doctors, Palanaippan Rajmohan. See, ‘CPS Statement on Abortion Related Case’, 5 September, 2013 
at http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/cps_statement_abortion_related_case/. See also, 
Bingham, J. and Newell, C. 2013. ‘No action on illegal abortion doctors; CPS says there is evidence to 
prosecute but it would not be in the public interest’. Daily Telegraph, 5 September, and Bingham, J. 
and Newell, C. 2013. ‘Prosecute abortion doctors, MPs urge; MPs unite over illegal abortion doctors’. 
Daily Telegraph 14 September. 
  4!‘Findings of termination of pregnancy inspections published’, Care Quality Commission, 12 July 
2012 at http://www.cqc.org.uk/content/findings-termination-pregnancy-inspections-published.!The 
CQC had also been asked to investigate the alleged pre-signing of HSA1 forms, the forms which two 
qualified doctors must sign in order to attest that the requirements of the Abortion Act 1967 are met 
and, hence, that the abortion is lawful. CQC did identify evidence of the pre-signing practice at 
fourteen NHS Trusts, although it also reported that it ‘ did not find any evidence that any women had 
poor outcomes of care at any of these locations’.  
5 Abortion (Sex Selection) Bill (2014-15), HC Deb vol 587 col 677-679 4 November 2014.  
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original bill, introduced by Conservative MP Fiona Bruce, was withdrawn after its 
second reading, but a revised version was tabled for debate as a possible amendment 
to the Serious Crime Bill (2014-2015). The amendment read that: ‘nothing in section 
1 of the Abortion Act 1967 is to be interpreted as allowing a pregnancy to be 
terminated on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child’.6 After debate in 
Parliament on 23rd February 2015, the proposed amendment was rejected, although 
an alternative amendment (New Clause 25 of the Serious Crimes Bill) which 
committed the government to assessing the evidence for the practice of sex-selective 
termination and, if necessary, to take action to change ‘prejudices, customs an 
traditions’ which constitute pressure to seek a sex-selective abortion was passed 
with an overwhelming majority.7 
 
Of course, if sex-selective abortion were indeed contrary to existing law, as 
was so confidently confirmed in 2012 by government representatives and healthcare 
bodies, the point of the original amendment would have been hard to discern. Why 
would Parliament prohibit a procedure that is already prohibited? Even if evidence 
had been discovered to suggest that an existing prohibition on sex-selective abortion 
was being routinely flouted (evidence which, ultimately, did not materialise), the 
apposite remedial measure would surely have been to improve law enforcement, not 
re-ban the practice. 
 
 The proposing MP’s explanation came down to the matter of clarity. In 
support of the provision, Bruce claimed that its purpose was not to change the law 
on abortion, but to ‘clarify beyond doubt, in statute, that sex-selective abortion is 
illegal in UK law’.8 Bruce’s explanation, in other words, was that although sex-
selective abortion is indeed prohibited by British law 9 , there is widespread 
misapprehension that it is not. In fact, as I set out to argue here, the inverse is far 
closer to the truth. The legal status of sex-selective abortion in Britain is (as I intend 
to demonstrate) a far more complex matter than Lansley’s statement presented it to 
be.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2014-
2015/0160/amend/seriouscrimeaddednames.pdf  
7 The original amendment was rejected by 292 votes to 201. Serious Crime Bill (2014-2015), HC Deb 
vol 593 col 113-130 23 February 2015, at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150223/debtext/150223-
0004.htm. New Clause 25 passed with 491 votes in favour and 2 against. See, Hansard (Daily 
Hansard). 23rd February 2015 (starting Column 113)  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150223/debtext/150223-
0003.htm 
8 ibid col 114.!
9 Bruce’s statement contained the misleading suggestion that the same law of abortion applies to the 
whole of the United Kingdom; the Abortion Act 1967 governs only England, Wales, and Scotland. 
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 I will proceed by laying out an initial argument to the effect that abortions 
which would not have been requested but for knowledge of fetal sex can be lawful 
under the terms of the Abortion Act 1967 where certain conditions are met, and that 
the route to demonstrating the legality of those abortions is exactly the same as is 
followed in far less controversial abortion scenarios. I will also advance the 
subsidiary argument that in almost any instance where a pregnant woman requests a 
‘sex-selective’ abortion, there is good reason to suppose that the legalising 
requirements of the Abortion Act are in fact met. Hence, while sex-selective 
abortions are not automatically lawful, it is reasonable to presume that they most 
often will be, under the law as it stands.  
 
I will subsequently consider two objections to the initial claim that sex-
selection can be lawful in the right conditions. The first challenges that claim on the 
ground that the interpretive argument it relies upon is far too permissive, bringing 
almost any abortion, including for the most trivial reasons, within the authorising 
scope of the Abortion Act. The second objection centres on the necessity of consent 
for lawful medical treatment, and questions whether valid patient consent can be 
reliably obtained for sex-selective abortion procedures. 
 
I set out to show that neither objection succeeds. That is to say, neither 
manages to show that sex-selective abortion is always illegal according to the terms 
of the Abortion Act. It goes without saying that, far from any question of its legality, 
the ethical significance of sex-based termination is a complex and contentious topic 
in its own right. Even in the heated arena of abortion discourse, sex-selection has 
proved a subject of acute moral controversy, not the least because of concerns that, 
where practiced, it is overwhelmingly used to select against females – the so-called 
‘gendercide’ issue.10 Whilst acknowledging the depth and breadth of the ethical 
debate about sex-selection, I will mostly restrict my comments here to an analysis of 
the relevant legal permissions, which turn chiefly on the provisions of the Abortion 
Act.11 This said, my discussion will not exclusively trace questions of legal doctrine !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10!See, for example, M A Warren, Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection (Rowman and Allanheld 
1985). Some commentators have eschewed the term ‘gendercide’ in favour of the alternative 
descriptors ‘femicide’ or ‘gynecide’ which better reflect the fact that sex selection, either through 
prenatal selection techniques, infanticide, or selective child neglect, almost invariably deselects 
females (see: H B Holmes and B Hoskins, ‘Preconception and Prenatal Sex Choice Technologies: A 
Path to Femicide?’ in Corea et al eds., Man-Made Women: How Reproductive Technologies Affect Women 
(Hutchinson 1984) 15-26; C Overall, ‘The Implications of Sex Selection by Mary Anne Warren’ 
(review article), Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1987) 17 683, and H B Holmes, ‘Review of Gendercide 
by Mary Anne Warren’, Bioethics (1987) 1 100. 
11 I put even further aside the far grander question whether sex-selective abortion is morally 
impermissible in virtue of the fact that all abortion is the impermissible destruction of human life. 
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and interpretation. With regard to the consent objection in particular, I will consider 
some normative claims that British law ought to adopt a prohibitive stance on sex-
selective abortion for paternalistic reasons.  
 
2. Sex-Selection and the Abortion Act 1967 
 
Lawful abortion in England, Wales and Scotland is governed by the Abortion Act 
1967. The Abortion Act stipulates the grounds on which medical professionals must 
act when performing lawful abortions, as well as setting down the procedural 
requirements for termination of pregnancy. These procedural regulations govern the 
facilities where abortions must be performed12; the need for the authorisation of two 
registered doctors13, and the recording of abortions carried out.14 To this day, the 
default rule for termination of pregnancy in British law is that it is a criminal 
offence, pursuant to provisions under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and, 
if the fetus is capable of being born alive, under the Infant Life Preservation Act 
1929.15 The Abortion Act therefore provides defences to what would otherwise be 
criminal offences of procuring miscarriage or child destruction. The statutory 
grounds for abortion are laid out in section 1 of the Act, which states that no 
criminal liability shall attach to someone performing an abortion where two doctors 
form an opinion in good faith that: 
 
a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the 
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the 
pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of 
the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or 
 
b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Abortion Act 1967 s1(3) and 1(3A). 
13 Abortion Act 1967 s1. 
14 Abortion Act 1967 s2.  
15!Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss58-59; Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 s1. S1(2) of the 
1929 Act stipulates a rebuttable presumption that a fetus of 28 weeks or more is ‘capable of being 
born alive’, although the threshold of viability is now generally taken to be lower, at around 24 
weeks.  
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c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the 
pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
 
d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer 
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. 
 
Pursuant to section 1(2) of the Act, in determining whether or not continued 
pregnancy would pose risks of injury to health referenced under ground a) or 
ground b), the doctors may take account of the woman’s ‘actual or reasonably 
foreseeable environment’. 
 
Whether or not the two doctors have formed their opinion that one or more of 
the section 1 grounds is made out in ‘good faith’ is a question of fact for the jury. 
The good faith requirement is an essential but easily overlooked provision of the 
Abortion Act. It is not correct to say that the Act provides an exception to criminal 
liability for abortion if and only if one of the contraindications in section 1 is present. 
Rather, the exception applies wherever two doctors are of the opinion, formed in good 
faith that one of the grounds is met. Consequently, showing that an abortion was 
performed unlawfully is not a matter of disproving the ground relied upon, but of 
demonstrating that a doctor’s acceptance of that ground was not in good faith, a 
court verdict which has proved extremely rare.16 
 
 
The first thing to note about the status of sex-selective abortion under the 
Abortion Act is that the statute makes no mention whatsoever of termination for 
reasons of fetal sex. There is no specified ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ ground in section 1, and 
the legislation is otherwise silent on the matter. The absence of a specific provision 
for sex-selective abortion has given rise to the widespread assumption that abortion 
for reasons of fetal sex is not covered by the Act, and is consequently always 
criminal. This is a false equivalence, however. The mistake is best brought out by 
means of examples. In her commentary on the sex-selective abortion controversy, 
Sally Sheldon provides the following two: 
 
Imagine a woman with two female children who comes from an ethnic group 
which places a very high value on sons. She and her husband live with her in-
laws, who threaten to throw them out if she gives birth to another daughter. 
Imagine another whose husband beats her and tells her that she will be subject 
to far worse violence if she gives birth to a daughter. In each of these 
situations, we would wish for the woman to be able to leave an abusive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16!R v Smith [1974] 1 All ER 376 is one of the only known examples of such a finding by an 
English court. After hearing evidence that the doctor in question had failed to perform any 
medical examination of the pregnant woman concerned, enquire about her medical history, 
or seek a second opinion, and moreover had made efforts to conceal the fact that the 
termination had taken place, the Court of Appeal held that the doctor’s conviction for an 
unlawfully performed abortion was safe.!
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situation or, better, to live in a world where such things do not happen. But 
while we wait for that world, a doctor who authorises a termination in such 
circumstances could make a strong legal case that she had acted in good faith 
to preserve the mental health of her patient.17 
 
As Sheldon’s examples demonstrate, the absence of a specific ground for sex-
selective abortion does not, in and of itself, preclude lawful terminations in which 
fetal sex is a sine qua non of the termination being requested. As Sheldon also notes, 
there is, likewise, no designated ground for abortion under the Act for the 
standardly accepted reason that pregnancy is the result of rape. Yet the legality of 
abortion in such circumstances has never been thought to depend on the existence of 
a “rape ground” in s1 of the Abortion Act. Rather, it is readily presumed that where 
pregnancy is brought about by rape, either ground a) or ground b) will be applicable, 
usually in the form of risk to mental health. The fact that the pregnancy is the result 
of rape is simply the background circumstance that gives rise to a specified ground 
for abortion, making that ground explicable and, hence, believable. 
 
Just as the fact that pregnancy was brought about by rape can form the 
background circumstances that establish a statutory ground for abortion, so it is 
possible to imagine cases in which the revealed sex of the fetus can create equivalent 
circumstances. As we saw from Sheldon’s examples, the factual matrix of those 
situations may take different forms.  Suppose, as per one of the examples, a woman 
reasonably fears that if she gives birth to a baby girl, rather than a boy, her husband 
will subject her to violence, or more violence. Or suppose instead that because the 
child is not a boy, she will be compelled to have yet more children in circumstances 
where a greater number of children to care for will have a seriously detrimental 
effect on her physical or mental health, and, or, on the wellbeing of her existing 
children. If her doctors are satisfied that either of these scenarios were realistic, then 
they will have formed an opinion that ground (a), (b) or even (c) is met. Outside of 
the procedural requirements, the legality of the abortion will be subject only to the 
condition that the doctors did indeed form their opinion in good faith – in other 
words, that they genuinely believed one of the grounds applied and performed the 
abortion on the basis of that belief, and in order to secure the wellbeing of the 
woman. 
 
 Following this thinking, we can see that those who infer the illegality of sex-
selection from the Abortion Act’s silence about it have conflated two distinct things: 
the statutory grounds for abortion, and the background circumstances giving rise to 
those grounds – what we might term the ‘explanations’ for abortion. The Abortion 
Act makes demands only about the grounds, not about the explanations behind 
them. Every lawful abortion must be supported by good faith medical belief in a 
specified ground, but there are no specifications as to explanations, either in terms of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17!S Sheldon, ‘Abortion for Reason of Sex: Correcting Some Basic Misunderstandings of the Law’, 
bpas Reproductive Review, 1 March 2012.!!
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those which are required or those which are excluded. All that is required of the 
explanation, legally speaking, is that the explanatory circumstances could plausibly 
place a woman within one of the section 1 grounds, usually by way of threatening 
her mental health, and, hence, that two doctors could plausibly form the good faith 
opinion that one of the grounds was met, this being (along with practice regulations) 
the consummate test for lawful abortion.  
 So far, I have not offered a definition of abortions that merit the description 
‘sex-selective’. Some may think that definition obvious. However, on a closer look, it 
becomes clear that even attempting to define precisely what amounts to aborting 
because of fetal sex forces one to attend to the distinction between grounds and 
explanations. Few, I think, take ‘sex-selective abortion’ to denote only those 
terminations that are requested out of sheer prejudice toward or distaste for a 
particular sex, unconnected to any further threat of harm to the pregnant woman 
concerned. Indeed, as we shall see shortly, there is good reason to regard 
terminations motivated solely by personal sexism as a fairly fanciful scenario. 
Presumably, those who contend that sex-selective abortion is illegal mean to suggest 
that any abortion in which the fetus’s sex was a ‘but-for’ cause of the woman’s 
request for termination is illegal, even if it is indeed the case that carrying the 
pregnancy to term will endanger the woman’s mental or physical health to a degree 
otherwise sufficient for one of the section 1 grounds. On this view, all abortions in 
which fetal sex is part of the explanation are unlawful, whether or not a legitimate 
ground (a threat of harm supervening on the fetus’s sex) is also made out. 
 On the contrary, however, the structure of the Abortion Act and the 
distinction between grounds and explanations yields the provisional conclusion that 
only an express declaration to the effect that fetal sex must not form any part of the 
background explanation for abortion would render all such abortions illegal. Apart 
from an explicit exclusion of this kind, the standard legal test, which looks only to 
whether good faith medical opinion was satisfied of one of the grounds, could be 
satisfied in the case of a ‘sex-selective’ abortion in precisely the same way that it 
often is when fetal sex is not part of the picture.  
A further comparison with a pregnant woman who requests an abortion 
because of financial constraints elaborates this point. In this fairly mundane sort of 
case, the woman desires an abortion because she does not possess the financial 
resources to care adequately for a child. Her financial circumstances do not in and of 
themselves constitute a ground for lawful abortion under the Abortion Act; there is 
no “impecuniousness ground” in section 1. Still, it is entirely possible that one or 
more of the contraindications for abortion in section 1 will supervene on the 
woman’s financial situation. The pressure of caring for a child without adequate 
financial resources—or even the mere prospect of such a burden—might threaten 
damage to her mental or physical health in any number of ways: by rendering her 
depressed, acutely anxious, chronically fatigued, or, in the extreme case, suicidal. To 
be sure, a contraindication does not automatically follow from the circumstance. 
Perhaps, notwithstanding the prospect of childrearing she cannot afford, the woman 
in question does not face any risk to her physical or mental wellbeing ‘greater than if 
the pregnancy were terminated’. Nevertheless, her impecuniousness could surely 
form the basis of a good faith judgment that the risk obtains, were she to attest as 
much. 
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Likewise, it may be argued, the only question for doctors when assessing the 
merits of a ‘sex-selective’ abortion is whether, in all of the circumstances, the 
possible implications of continued pregnancy for the woman concerned trigger one 
of the statutory grounds. And the only question for a jury, should the legality of 
such an abortion come under scrutiny, is whether those doctors formed that belief in 
good faith. Neither the actual existence of the grounds nor a medical professional’s 
good faith belief in them depends on the particular causal nexus underlying them, 
except insofar as credibility is at issue. And inkeeping with the structure of the Act, 
this includes where fetal sex is part of the wider explanation. 
 
3. Selective Abortion and Selective Implantation 
The foregoing argument aims to show that abortions with fetal-sex-explanations 
may or may not be lawful according to the terms of the Abortion Act, depending on 
whether the overall factual matrix gives rise to a good faith belief that one of the 
grounds in section 1 is made out. This is because the legality of abortion under the 
statute depends only on adducing the right grounds and not the ‘right’ explanations, 
an implicit distinction which is fundamental to understanding the authorising 
conditions of the Act. 
 
The upshot is that those who take the statute’s silence on sex-selection as 
indicative of the unlawfulness of any abortion in which fetal sex is part of the 
explanation are wrong to draw that inference. This false equation has been a 
wellspring of misstatement and misunderstanding about the legal status of sex-
selective abortion in recent years. There is, however, a second notable source of 
misunderstanding about the legality of abortion for reasons of fetal sex. As 
sociologist Ellie Lee has pointed out, some attempted clarifications of the law have 
suggested a degree of confusion between the provisions of the Abortion Act and the 
regulation of embryo selection for in vitro fertilization under the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008.18 Indeed, spokespeople from medical regulation bodies 
appeared to conflate the legal rules of abortion and those of assisted reproduction in 
their account of the legal status of sex-selective abortion following the 2012 
Telegraph story. Issuing a statement on behalf of the General Medical Council, its 
chief executive Niall Dickson stated the law thus: 
 
Sex selection through abortion is illegal in this country and is a clear breach of 
our guidance for doctors. Doctors involved in such activity are putting their 
registration and careers at risk. The law in the UK is clear: terminating a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18!See: E Lee, ‘Recent Myths and Misunderstandings about Abortion Law’, in British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service document, Britain’s Abortion Law: What it Says and Why (2012), 10-13; see also E 
Jackson, ‘The Legality of Abortion for Fetal Sex’, in the same volume, 19-21. 
http://www.reproductivereview.org/images/uploads/Britains_abortion_law.pdf (accessed June 
2015).!
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pregnancy on the grounds of a foetus’s sex is illegal under the 1967 Abortion 
Act unless specific hereditary diseases are involved. (This is set out in the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2001[sic]).19 
 
Dickson’s reference to the 2001 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(HFEA) was meant to refer to the more recent HFEA 2008, which updated the 1990 
HFE Act, an error which was quickly rectified. However, his reliance on the HFEA 
as authority for the proposition that abortion for reasons of fetal sex is unlawful 
except where the sex of the fetus can be linked to a hereditary disease is unfounded. 
The HFE legislation was passed to regulate (among other things) the use of pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in assisted reproduction techniques. In other 
words, it set out the permissions for screening embryos prior to implantation in the 
womb in the process of IVF. Under that legislation, genetic testing on embryos in 
the process of fertility treatment is restricted to very particular uses. Testing 
embryos to determine their sex prior to implantation is prohibited by the Act except 
in circumstances where there is a risk that the embryo carries a genetic disease, and 
the disease itself is sex-linked.20 Consequently, it is against the law for individuals 
using IVF techniques to test the sex of embryos prior to implantation simply 
because of a social preference for a boy or a girl.  
 
The qualified prohibition on sex-selection in the HFE legislation has no 
application to abortion, however. Its provisions are concerned exclusively with the 
permissibility of PGD for the purposes of embryo selection in IVF, and not at all 
with the legal grounds or the explanations for abortion. Nothing about the legality 
of sex-selection in abortion therefore follows from the provisions of the HFEA. In a 
later clarification, the General Medical Council added the statement that 
‘terminating a pregnancy on grounds of the fetus’s sex is not covered in the 
[Abortion] Act, and therefore remains illegal’.21 This, of course, is merely another 
iteration of the false inference considered above: that the absence of a specified 
ground for sex-selection in the Abortion Act entails the illegality of all abortion in 
which fetal sex forms part of the explanation.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19!On 22 August 2012 the GMC updated its official guidance to read that!‘Abortions provided solely 
on grounds of the sex of the foetus are not legal in the UK. We have launched investigations into the 
fitness to practice of the doctors involved. We also want to remind all doctors that they must work 
within the law’, at http://www.gmc-uk.org/publications/12225.asp. An abridged version of the 
original statement can be found at http://www.gmc-uk.org/news/12102.asp?. The full excerpt is 
reproduced in in the British Pregnancy Advisory Service document (ibid) 11 and 55.!
20!Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, Schedule 2.!!
21!As was the case with its earlier statement,!the GMC’s revision was eventually removed in favour of 
the statement detailed in note 20, above, and is hence no longer available, but referenced in the 
British Pregnancy Advisory Service document (n 19) page 11. 
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It is not only the GMC that erroneously believed the legality of sex-selective 
abortion is constrained by the law on assisted reproduction. A statement released 
around the same time by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
(RCOG) made the following claims: 
 
Sex selection is illegal in this country and abortion based on the baby’s gender 
for non-medical purposes is unlawful. Abortion is already heavily regulated in 
the UK and sex selection is only allowed in very specific conditions such as in 
the case of hereditary disease as stated in the HFEA Act [sic] 2008.22 
 
As is apparent, the RCOG’s initial statement simply repeated the mistake made 
by the GMC, failing to separate the law of assisted reproduction with the law of 
abortion. In May 2014, the Department of Health attempted itself to formally and 
accurately state the law pertaining to abortion for reasons of fetal sex, but with no 
greater success. In a policy document entitled ‘Guidance in Relation to the 
Requirements of the Abortion Act 1967’, it described the state of the law in these 
terms:  
Abortion on the grounds of gender alone is illegal. Gender is not itself a lawful 
ground under the Abortion Act. However, it is lawful to abort a fetus where 
two RMPs [registered medical practitioners] are of the opinion, formed in 
good faith, that “there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would 
suffer from serious physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously 
handicapped”, and some serious conditions are known to be gender-related.23 
 
 
The Department of Health’s statement is an intriguing blend of 
misunderstandings about abortion law. First, it embraces the familiar mistake that 
the absence of a specified ground for sex-selective abortion entails the blanket 
illegality of all abortions in which fetal sex is a but-for cause. Second, and relatedly, 
it fails to distinguish between grounds for abortion and the explanations that give 
rise to those grounds, and hence fails to account for the legality of abortions wherein !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22!Dr Tony Facloner, President (in 2012) RCOG. Like the GMC, the RCOG subsequently withdrew 
its original statement and replaced it with a statement which acknowledged that ‘[T]here are social 
and cultural reasons for preferring one gender over another and we need to know more about why 
these occur. The issues are complex. For instance, women may be coerced or threatened with violence 
into having an abortion. The priority would be to identity who these women are and to provide them 
with support.’ The original statement and the revised version can be found in the British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service document (above n 19) at page 10. !
23!Department of Health, ‘Guidance in Relation to the Requirements of the Abortion Act 1967’, May 
2014, 10, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/313459/2014050
9_-_Abortion_Guidance_Document.pdf.!
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at least one statutory ground is met notwithstanding the fact that fetal sex forms an 
integral part of the explanation as to why it is met (or, to be more accurate, why two 
doctors may form in good faith an opinion to that effect). Put differently, it ignores 
the possibility that an abortion in which fetal sex is a key factor may not be an 
abortion for reasons of ‘gender alone’. 
 
Thirdly, the statement evinces yet another misunderstanding of the 
relationship between sex-selective abortion and abortion for fetal disability that 
seems, again, to stem from the mixing up of legal norms governing abortion and 
assisted reproduction. The statement accurately notes that substantial risk of a 
serious abnormality is a recognised contraindication in the Abortion Act (s1(1)(d)), 
and that some hereditary diseases can indeed be sex-related. As was noted, the 
HFEA 2008 prohibits sex-screening of embryos in pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis except where a sex-linked hereditary disease is at issue. But the same 
protocol does not carry over to abortion. The disability ground for abortion will of 
course be met wherever two doctors are convinced that the would-be child has a 
substantial risk of developing a serious handicap, including where this judgment is 
formed in light of its sex. But ground (d) of section 1 is not the only ground for 
which fetal sex can form part of the background explanation. As any number of 
examples demonstrate, fetal sex, just like multitudinous other circumstances 
including financial pressure, relational instability, or pregnancy-through-rape, could 
form part of the explanation for any of the first three grounds specified in section 1 
of the Abortion Act.  
 
4. Two Objections 
So far, then, I have argued that sex-selective abortion could be lawful under the 
terms of the Abortion Act, so long as one of the grounds in section 1 is credibly 
attested to. The reasons for widespread misapprehension of the legal situation are, I 
suggested, twofold. The first is the mistaken tendency to equate the absence of a 
specific ground for sex-selective abortion with the illegality of all abortions in which 
fetal sex forms part of the explanation. The second is the conflation of rules 
governing sex-selection in assisted reproduction with the rules pertaining to 
abortion. My argument on the first count may raise a question as to whether all 
abortion in which fetal sex is a but-for cause is even ‘sex-selective abortion’ properly 
so called. As we have seen, such abortions can often be re-described as abortion for 
other, legally adequate, grounds or reasons. Moreover, it merits pointing out that 
abortions are not conventionally described after their explanations, rather than their 
legal grounds, (we do not speak of “rape abortions” or “impecuniousness abortions” 
or “derailing-of-life-plans abortions”). To introduce the nomenclature of ‘sex-
selective abortion’ is, therefore, a notable breach of the norm, although I will say no 
more about this here.  
 
With the initial argument sketched out, I now want to examine two significant 
objections to the proposition that sex-selective abortion is potentially lawful 
according to the Abortion Act. The first objection pushes back against the 
distinction I drew between the grounds and explanations for abortion and doubts 
the reliability of that distinction as a tool for interpreting the Abortion Act. The 
! 13!
second objection surrounds the issue of consent to abortion, a particularly live 
question where sex selection is concerned. 
 It goes almost without saying that the spectrum of objections to sex-selective 
abortion is both extensive and varied. Those objections range from the familiar 
allegation of ‘gendercide’ or ‘femicide’, with its obvious allusions to genocidal 
atrocities,24 to concerns about an altered sex ratio and its implications25; a possible 
slippery slope toward a eugenics-driven dystopia, where all unwanted characteristics 
are screened out prenatally and human beings are built to specification,26 and to 
claims that sex selection contributes meaningfully to sex inequality and the 
subordination of existing women.27   
 My reason for focusing on these two particular objections attaches to my 
interest in expositing the law as it currently stands. The two objections to which I 
attend pertain to the current legal status of sex selective abortion and are thus 
distinguishable from the myriad normative arguments about which policy the law 
ought to adopt. To my mind, the only other objection which clearly challenges the 
extant legality of sex selection is the practice constitutes a form of unlawful sex 
discrimination against women. Speaking in support of the amendment to the Serious 
Crimes Bill, MP Fiona Bruce decried the use of abortion to prevent the birth of girls 
in particular as ‘a gross form of sex discrimination’ and ‘the first and most 
fundamental form of violence against women and girls’.28 Some recent attempts in 
the US to combat the perceived problem of sex selection through legislative 
measures have invoked the anti-discrimination imperative, analogizing sex selection !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24!See above n 10, and see also, J Hanmer and S Allen, ‘Reproductive Engineering: The Final 
Solution’ (1982) 2 Gender Issues 53-74; R Steinbacher, ‘Sex Preselection: From Here to Fraternity’ in 
C Gould eds. Beyond Domination (Rowman and Littlefield 1984) 274-282; G Corea, The Mother 
Machine (Women’s Press 1985) at 206, and ‘Gendercide: The Worldwide War on Baby Girls’, The 
Economist 4 March 2010. 
25 See: S Dubuc  and D Coleman, ‘An Increase in the Sex Ratio of Births to India-born Mothers in 
England and Wales: Evidence for Sex-Selective Abortion’ (2007)  33 Population and Development 
Review 383-400; J Fletcher, ‘Ethics and Public Policy: Should Sex Choice be Discouraged?’ in 
Bennett et al ed. Sex Selection of Children (Academic Press 1983) 213 and B Hoskins and H Holmes, 
‘Technology and Prenatal Femicide’ in R Arditti et al eds. Test-Tube Women: What Future for 
Motherhood (Routledge 1984) 237. 
26 See D Wertz and J Fletcher, ‘Sex Selection through Prenatal Diagnosis: a Feminist Critique’, in H 
Holmes and L Purdy eds., Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Indiana University Press 1992) 245. 
27 See, for example: C Chambers, ‘Autonomy and Equality in Cultural Perspective: Response to 
Sawitri Saharso’, (2004):  5 Feminist Theory 329; Overall (n 10) and J Raymond, Women as Wombs 
(Harper Collins 1993). This list of objections is by no means exhaustive. Further challenges have 
included the claim that controlling the sex of one’s future child fails to adopt the correct parental 
attitude of accepting one’s child as she is (see R McDougall, ‘Acting Parentally: An Argument 
Against Sex Selection’, (2005) 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 601) and that prenatal sex selection 
reinforces essentialist beliefs about gender identity (see V Seavilleklein and S Sherwin, ‘The Myth of 
the Gendered Chromosome: Sex Selection and the Social Interest’ (2007) 16 Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 7). 
28 Fiona Bruce, Hansard (Daily Hansard). 23rd February 2015 (starting Column 113)  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150223/debtext/150223-
0003.htm!
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to race and disability discrimination.29  
 
 As I see it, however, the position in British law that a human being lacks 
legally recognized personhood status until live birth presents a major obstacle for 
the discrimination argument.30 Since laws against sex discrimination do not protect 
non-persons, there is a problem in selective abortion of locating the subject of the 
discriminatory practice – a possible future person who is prevented from existing 
cannot stand in the place of a victim of discrimination. For this reason, I am not 
offering any further analysis of the sex discrimination objection. 
 
 
5. Grounds and Explanations 
 
In making the case that sex-selective abortion can be lawful under the terms of the 
Abortion Act, I relied on an important distinction between the legal grounds and 
what I termed the ‘explanations’ for abortion. I argued that since the Act only makes 
demands as to the grounds and not the explanations, and since knowledge of fetal 
sex can conceivably form part of a factual matrix which gives rise to one of the 
recognised grounds, it is possible to imagine lawful abortions which would not have 
been desired but for knowledge of fetal sex. If these are aptly called ‘sex-selective 
abortions’, then sex-selection can be lawful in certain conditions.  
 
However, some doubts may be raised as to whether the grounds-explanations 
distinction can be relied upon when interpreting the permissions of the Abortion 
Act. After all, someone might say, it is always possible to segregate the statutory 
grounds for abortion from the further explanations underwriting them. Deploying 
this strategy, one could even make the case for legality of abortions which the 
Abortion Act clearly does not mean to decriminalise. 
We might take the example, sometimes mentioned in ethical discussion about 
abortion, of a woman who wishes to abort a pregnancy merely because it interferes 
with a booked holiday.31 In this example, let us say that the interference with the 
holiday is the sole reason the woman desires the abortion; she would simply rather 
go on the holiday than continue the pregnancy. It is generally supposed that this is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29!The Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Non-Discrimination Act passed by 
Arizona in 2011 (HB 2443) makes it a felony for doctors to knowingly perform an abortion for race or 
sex selective reasons. The same legislation was introduced into US Congress in 2008. It was defeated 
in 2012, but reintroduced in 2013. See, generally, S Kalantry, ‘Sex Selection in the United States and 
India: A Contextualist Feminist Approach’ (2013) UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign 
Affairs 61 and J Musial, ‘Fetal citizenship in the borderlands: Arizona’s house bill!2443 and state 
logics of racism and orientalism’ (2014) 20 Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and 
Culture 262.!
30!See Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1979] QB 276; Evans v Amicus Health Care [2003] 
EWHC 2161 (Fam) and A-G Ref No 3 of 1994 [1997] 3 All ER 936.!!
31!See, for example, the use of the example in Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’ [1971] 
1 P&PA 47.!
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not an abortion decriminalised by the Abortion Act. If any abortion is outwith its 
scope, surely this is. However, deploying the grounds-explanations distinction, 
perhaps it is possible to make the same move as in the case of the ‘legal’ sex-selective 
termination. If two doctors can only be convinced that the woman’s desire to go on 
the holiday is fervent enough that, were the pregnancy to impede her, a risk of harm 
to her mental health would arise greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, the 
abortion is legal. 
 
The objection is thus a reductio ad absurdum of the interpretive argument 
which led to my claim that sex-selective abortion can be lawful. The reductio 
argument can be made with various hypotheticals. Consider now another case, in 
which a woman desires an abortion because, having found out that the child born 
will have red hair, she no longer wants it (call this case ‘gingerphobia’). Following 
from the grounds-explanation distinction, it appears that in order to lawfully obtain 
an abortion she need only convince doctors that her abhorrence of red-headed 
children is such that giving birth to the child will risk sufficient harm to her mental 
health, it being of no consequence how that risk has materialised.  
 
The problem, in both cases, is that the very same distinction relied upon to 
demonstrate the possible legality of sex-selective abortion can be deployed in exactly 
the same way to illustrate the possible legality of ‘holiday abortion’ and 
‘gingerphobia’. Since, however, these cases seem to describe abortions that cannot 
possibly be within the authorising remit of the Abortion Act, the argument based on 
the grounds-explanations distinction looks faulty. It cannot be the meaning of the 
statute to turn every conceivable reason for having an abortion, including the most 
arbitrary or irrational, into a legally acceptable one, so long as the desire for 
abortion is sufficiently intense.  
 
How might one answer this objection? To recapitulate, the apparent problem 
is that once the grounds for abortion are distinguished from the explanations 
thereof, there is no longer any theoretical limit on the sorts of reasons for having an 
abortion that may be legally valid, and that this cannot be a correct interpretation of 
the Abortion Act. Indeed, the suggestion that the Act could legitimate practically 
any reason for abortion might seem to be in tension with the entire structure of 
British abortion law, within which the Abortion Act fulfils the role of creating 
bounded exceptions to an otherwise criminal practice, but does not repeal its de facto 
criminal liability. In light of this, interpreting the statute in such a way that does not 
absolutely exclude any reason for an abortion is not inkeeping with the purpose and 
the spirit of the legislation – or so it might be claimed. 
 
Yet it must be remembered that the ordinary protocol of the Abortion Act is 
to isolate the grounds for abortion from the explanations and only to make demands 
in respect of the former. Abortions in which pregnancy was brought about through 
rape, or where a woman faces severe financial hardship, are never, legally speaking, 
abortions on those grounds
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health which those circumstances generate. Nor is it easy to imagine how the statute 
could impose any requirements as to explanations consistently with licensing 
abortion on one or more grounds – the main purpose of the Act. The combinations 
of facts on which any one ground might supervene are, naturally, limitless. But if it 
is the purpose of the Act to authorise abortion wherever one of the grounds is met 
(read: attested to in good faith by two medical professionals), then it may be argued 
that its main purpose would be frustrated by any conditions on the explanations 
which might give rise to them.  
 
Still, for an abortion to be lawful a credible link must be forged between the 
circumstances in question and a physical or mental health risk of the kind described 
in section 1. This gives a clue as to how the ‘holiday abortion’ and ‘gingerphobia’ 
reductios might be answered. As in the case of lawful sex-selective abortions, the 
explanation—including what I have described as the ‘trivial’ reason for the 
abortion—must connect to a decidedly non-trivial justification for abortion 
permitted by the Act: the ground. This raises the question as to what circumstances 
could conceivably constitute that ground in ‘holiday abortion’ and ‘gingerphobia’. It 
would be a rare case indeed in which interference with a booked holiday or the future 
child’s hair colour makes the difference between a pregnancy which poses a 
meaningful risk to the physical or mental health of a woman and one which does not, 
(especially since it is a supposed feature of those hypotheticals that the woman would 
not wish to terminate her pregnancy otherwise). With some imagination, however, it 
is possible to construct fitting explanations. Perhaps, for instance, the holiday in 
question is one for which the pregnant woman had been saving money towards for 
years, and which cannot now possibly be postponed. Furthermore, we might suppose 
that her current mental state is sufficiently fragile (perhaps she is recovering from 
serious depression) that the elimination of her main source of hope and expectation 
at that time is likely to cause a significant deterioration in her mental health, far 
more so than if the pregnancy were terminated and she goes on the holiday. 
 
Now imagine the situation of a different pregnant woman. In the past, she 
was the victim of a brutal assault, perpetrated by an assailant with red hair. However 
irrational the disposition, she has since never been able to completely disassociate 
red  hair from her traumatic experience. Because of this, she suspects, with some 
basis, that were she to have a red-haired child, she would be constantly reminded of 
her assault. She moreover finds the idea of carrying a pregnancy to term thereafter 
to give up the baby for adoption extremely distressing. Consequently, upon finding 
out that the fetus is genetically determined to have red hair, she wishes to have an 
abortion.32 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32!We can ignore for now the fact that in utero genetic screening for hair colour is neither legal nor, to 
my knowledge, a current capability of prenatal screening technology, since the question we are 
concerned with here is only whether the legal argument about sex-selective abortion that I have 
ventured can in principle be used to construe far wider permissions than the Abortion Act intends to 
grant. 
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 With these background circumstances filled in, it is possible to see how the 
putatively ‘trivial’ reason for the abortion (the holiday or the hair colour) could form 
part of the wider explanation for an abortion ground. In such unusual cases, 
credibility is likely to be the biggest obstacle. The more outlandish the explanation 
for an abortion, the less believable the ground. Without knowing more, one might 
simply doubt that a compromised holiday generates a serious welfare concern for 
any pregnant woman – similarly so regarding the hair colour of the future child. 
Once the credibility obstacle is surmounted, however, ‘holiday abortion’ and 
‘gingerphobia’ begin to look far less like reductios of the original argument. Rather, 
with all of the blanks filled in, they may simply look to be within the authorizing 
ambit of the Abortion Act, and firmly within its purpose if the abortions are carried 
out to spare the woman mental anguish.  
 
 It bears repeating that ‘holiday abortion’ and ‘gingerphobia’ are 
extraordinary cases. Indeed, any circumstances in which a holiday or the hair colour 
of the future child partly explains an abortion ground would have to be extremely 
unusual. The common conception that abortions for reasons such as these are 
abortions for ‘trivial’ reasons is not wrong, therefore, but only incomplete. It fails to 
account for the possibility that any fact or circumstance which, standing alone, is 
trivial in reproductive decision-making, may, if married with other very particular 
facts, constitute a set of conditions that are jointly sufficient to place a woman’s 
health in jeopardy if a pregnancy is continued. Still, as extraordinary as ‘holiday 
abortion’ and ‘gingerphobia’ undoubtedly are, most would consider it more 
extraordinary for a pregnant woman to desire an abortion merely to save from 
canceling a holiday, or out of blind prejudice against people with a particular hair 
colour, unaccompanied by any explanation of a wider threat of harm. Once 
appreciating this, one might even think there is good reason to even expect that 
wherever a woman requests abortion for a putatively trivial reason, some more 
serious interest is in fact at stake. 
In a similar vein, the unavoidable costs of terminating pregnancy may give us 
cause to doubt that those who do seek out ‘sex selective’ abortions in Britain do so 
purely for family balancing purposes or out of personal sexism, where no threat to 
their personal wellbeing presents itself. This is not to call into question the 
prevalence of so-called ‘son preference’ which, as a wealth of research has shown, is a 
common attitude in the Western world, although the strength of that preference 
clearly pales in comparison with that of countries with the highest rates of sex 
selection, such as India and China.33 Some such studies carried out in the US !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
33!Surveying the evidence in 1990, D Morgan claimed that ‘son-preference has roots implanted as 
firmly in Western as in other cultures’ (D Morgan, ‘Legal and Ethical Dilemmas of Fetal Sex 
Identification and Gender Selection’, in A Templeton and D Cusine eds., Reproductive Medicine and the 
Law (Churchill Livingstone 1990) 70). Surveys carried out in both the UK and the Unites States have 
revealed an appreciable amount of son preference, especially for firstborns (D Morgan at 71; N 
Williamson, Sons or Daughters: A Cross Cultural Survey of Parental Preferences (Sage 1976); R 
Steinbacher and F Gilroy, ‘Sex Selection Technology: A Prediction of its Use and Effect’, (1990) 124 
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revealed a strong preference for male first-born children and only children.34 
However, the sex preference surveys do not focus on whether prospective parents 
would be willing to make use of abortion in particular as a means of ensuring male 
offspring. Rather, they indicate only what those sex preferences are, and in some 
cases, whether the participants would avail themselves of preconception sex 
selection techniques.35 Such techniques are accompanied by none of the typical costs 
of abortion: costs in time, inconvenience, (often) money, pain, and, for some, the 
emotional costs of ending a pregnancy already in progress. Using abortion as a 
method of sex-selection is far from a zero-sum decision.   
Because of this consideration, it is difficult to extrapolate from the evidence of 
son preference in Western cultures a widespread willingness to secure those 
preferences through termination. Indeed, lack of evidence of a high sex ratio 
(meaning, a preponderance of males) in Britain indicates that the existing son 
preference is not, on the whole, strong enough to outweigh the costs of abortion, 
unlike in the Indian context, where the dowry system and family economic reliance 
on males makes termination, and even infanticide, a price worth paying to ensure 
male offspring.36 For this reason, among others, Diemut Bubeck cautions against the 
tendency to project the ‘femicide’ problem of the most patriarchal countries onto the 
more ‘gender-egalitarian’ ones, and to imagine that a permissive stance on sex 
selection would yield similar results.37 She concludes that sex selective abortion ‘is 
not very likely on a grand scale in the latter due mainly to the cost of the currently !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Journal of Psychology 283). However, Morgan’s suggestion that son preference is as strong in 
Western cultures as in others is clearly overstated. For commentary on son preference in India and a 
comparative overview see S Kalantry (n 30) and S Saharso, ‘SSA: Gender, Culture and Dutch Public 
Policy’, (2005) 5 Ethnicities 248 and ‘Feminist Ethics, Autonomy and the Politics of Multiculturalism’ 
(2003) 4 Feminist Theory 199. 
34!See N Williamson, ‘Parental Preferences and Sex Selection’, in N Bennett ed. Sex Selection of 
Children (Academic Press 1983). !
35!The study carried out by Steinbacher and Gilroy (n 34) posed the following question to the 
volunteers: “Imagine a time when you are married, or if you are currently married, when you could 
inexpensively purchase a device or a pill that would allow you to select a boy or girl for your first 
child. Would you buy it and use it? If you answered ‘Yes’, what sex would you select?”. 
36"Despite evidence reported in 2007 by S. Dubuc and D. Coleman that the sex ratio indicated a small 
minority of Indian-born women in England and Wales making use of prenatal sex selection against 
females (above n 26), recent Department of Health investigations into ‘gender ratio at birth’ found 
that the sex ratio between 2007-2011 was ‘well within the boundaries for normal populations’ and 
that ‘when broken down by mother’s country of birth, no group is statistically different from the 
range that we would expect to see naturally occurring’ (Department of Health, 2013. Birth Ratios in 
the UK – A report of gender ratios at birth in the UK.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/200527/Gender_
birth_ratio_in_the_UK.pdf. See also: Department of Health. 2014a. ‘Birth Ratios in England and 
Wales – A report on gender ratios at birth  
in England and Wales’.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/313559/Sex_Sele
ction_in_England_and_Wales_analysis_April_2014_NM_comments.pdf 
37!D Bubeck, ‘Sex Selection: The Feminist Response’, in J Burley and J Harris eds., A Companion to 
Genethics (Blackwell 2002) 216. 
! 19!
required sex determination and subsequent abortion (although this prediction might 
change is cheap and reliable preconceptive sex selection became possible).’38 
Things would of course be very different if the usual costs of abortion could 
be entirely eliminated. We might imagine a counterfactual world in which abortion 
can be obtained up to a fairly late stage through the use of a painless and instantly 
effective injection, which causes the pregnancy simply to vanish (no need for surgery 
or for bodily contractions to expel the foetus), and in which advances in fertility 
treatment were such that becoming pregnant again instantly, if that were desired, is 
reliable, free, and easy. In circumstances like these, the prospect that many women 
might wish to avail themselves of the termination option for reasons of family 
balancing, or a greater preference for one or other sex, takes on greater plausibility. 
Needless to say, this is not what abortion is or could ever be like in the world as it 
is.39 
  
These considerations might therefore support an important epistemic 
presumption about any abortion requested upon revelation of fetal sex, this being 
that where knowledge of fetal sex underwrites a woman’s request for abortion, her 
surrounding circumstances will, in all likelihood, substantiate one of the physical or 
mental health grounds specified in the Abortion Act. That is, the very request for 
the abortion is a good reason in itself to believe that some further threat of harm 
supervening on the sex of the future child poses a risk to the physical or mental 
wellbeing of the woman greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, which is all 
that doctors must believe, in good faith, to lawfully perform the abortion before 24 
weeks of pregnancy. (It is, of course, a silent stage of this calculation that the 
physical and mental health risks associated with a pre-24 week abortion are 
themselves fairly negligible. While there is no space to elaborate on these claims 
here, it has long been accepted by professional health bodies that the physical risks 
of pre-24 week abortion are extremely minimal, particularly when compared with 
the risks of continuing a pregnancy to term, which is the relevant counterfactual for 
the purposes of section 1(a).40) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38!ibid 221.!
39!On this point, there is an important comparison to be made between selecting for sex through pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in assisted reproduction and sex selecting through abortion. A 
woman undergoing IVF treatment and who already has two male children might have the desire to 
select only female embryos for implantation for reasons of family balancing or simple sexism 
(although, as was seen, this would be legally prohibited except where sex-selection is disease related). 
Selecting for sex during this process would not otherwise affect the treatment or impact the woman 
detrimentally in any way.  !
40!See RCOG policy document, ‘The Care of Women Requesting Induced Abortion’ (Evidence-Based 
Clinical Guideline No 7), at https://www.rcog.org.uk/en/guidelines-research-
services/guidelines/the-care-of-women-requesting-induced-abortion/. Section 2.2 of the guidance 
states that ‘Women should be advised that abortion is generally safer than continuing a pregnancy to 
term.’ It also recommends patients be informed that most women who have abortions do not 
experience adverse psychological sequelae. For an extended comment about claims that abortion is 
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This may sound like a bold assertion. It might also be pointed out that the 
rationale for the epistemic presumption I defend could be extended to absolutely all 
requests for abortion up to 24 weeks, not only requests in which fetal sex is 
pertinent to the explanation.41 It would seem to follow from that argument that the 
costliness of abortion always warrants the assumption that if a woman is motivated 
enough to request it, continued pregnancy does indeed pose a risk to her wellbeing 
greater than if the pregnancy were ended, whether the request stems from the bare 
desire to avoid motherhood (or adoption), or anything else that renders the 
pregnancy unwanted. If this is indeed the implication, then I am content to accept it. 
My claim, remember, is only that without yet knowing more about an abortion 
request, it is always more likely than not that a physical or mental health risk 
greater than the risks associated with termination are at issue, at least where the 
termination occurs early enough. 
 
Still, the more extraordinary the constellation of facts, the more medical 
professionals may require by way of explanation to connect the dots. Hence there is 
no need for any further explanation in the pregnancy-through-rape case, where the 
resulting threat to wellbeing is entirely perspicuous, but a lot of explaining to do in 
my farfetched example of the lawful ‘holiday abortion’. The lawful ‘sex-selective’ 
abortion probably sits somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. The 
applicable ground, whichever it is, will probably require less explaining than is true 
of ‘holiday abortion’. The huge social and financial significance that can attach to the 
sex of one’s offspring in specific cultural or religious communities might even suffice 
to illuminate the relevant threat to the wellbeing of a woman within such a 
community, without the need for very much more information about her particular 
situation. But the inference from the sex of the fetus to a health risk will not be 
anywhere near as obvious or natural as it is in the rape scenario. Just how much by 
way of precise explanation medical professionals should require in order to form 
their good faith belief is certainly debatable, and will probably vary across individual 
cases. Even so, the presumption that any woman who wishes to end a pregnancy 
badly enough to have an abortion meets one of the section 1 grounds is, I think, a 
supportable one. 
 
6. The Consent Objection 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
commonly associated with negative emotional reactions, especially regret, see K Greasley, ‘Abortion 
and Regret’ (2012) Journal of Medical Ethics 705. 
41!I am leaving entirely out of this discussion the so-called ‘statistical argument’, which claims that 
because abortion before 24 weeks is statistically far less risky than childbirth, abortion up to that 
time-limit is in fact always lawful under ground (a). While the statistical argument has some  
academic support (see, e.g., Morgan (n 34) at 72), it still presents a reading of the Abortion Act that 
many interpreters of the legislation might be reluctant to accept, which is why I do not rely on it 
here.  
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So far, I have argued that abortions for which knowledge of fetal sex is a ‘but for’ 
cause can be lawful according to the terms of the Abortion Act and that there is good 
reason for presuming that one of the statutory grounds for abortion will be met 
wherever a woman requests an abortion with fetal-sex-explanations before 24 weeks 
of pregnancy. But an altogether different objection might be raised at this juncture. 
It may be true, as I have argued, that some or even most women requesting abortion 
partly for reasons of fetal sex do indeed face risks to their physical or mental health 
sufficient to raise a contraindication in the Act. If this is indeed so, however, the 
concern might be raised that pressure, duress or coercion will often be a feature of 
those abortion decisions. That is, it may be objected that sex-selective abortions are 
rarely likely to be consensual.  
 
Recall the kinds of examples we considered at the beginning of the 
discussion. A woman requests an abortion because her family will shun her if she has 
another girl. A woman requests an abortion because her husband will abuse her if 
she does not produce a boy. A woman requests an abortion because, owing to the 
cultural repercussions of having a girl, it will financially ruin her family. Are these 
genuinely consensual abortions? If not, it may appear that the sex-selective 
abortions which most obviously fulfil the section 1 requirements of the Abortion Act 
are nonetheless unlawful for a different reason: that they are not consensually 
performed. 
 
 The consent issue is a notable ground of feminist disquiet about sex-selective 
abortion. Feminist thinking is, of course, a broad church, and feminist commentators 
have not been univocal in their treatment of the sex selection problem.42 The 
disparate voices are unified in regarding it as hugely significant that fetuses 
terminated because of their sex are overwhelmingly likely to be female (as April 
Cherry puts it, ‘it is morally relevant to me that the fetus is terminated because she 
is a girl and not because she is a fetus – gender neutral’43). The ambivalence creeps 
in at the point of asking which policy best promotes the feminist’s interest in sex 
equality. Some of those who equate sex selection with ‘femicide’ and the future 
disempowerment of women have advocated an outright ban of the practice as the 
only tolerable solution.44 Others, whilst acknowledging the moral dubiousness of sex 
selection, have argued that abrogating any of women’s reproductive freedoms ‘is to 
nibble away at our hard-won reproductive control’ and risks too much in the way of 
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42!For a useful overview of the competing analyses, see Bubeck (n 38). 
43 A Cherry, ‘A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a Matter of Choice?’ (1995) 
10 Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal 161, 184. 
44!See Corea (n 25); Raymond (n 28) and R Rowland, Living Laboratories: Women and Reproductive 
Technologies (Lime Tree 1992). 
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constricting women’s autonomy.45 Still others focus their attention on the harm that 
choosing sex selection causes to existing women and girls, either by reducing their 
numbers (and hence, their power) relative to men, expressing misogyny (Tabitha 
Powledge writes that ‘to prefer males is, unavoidably, to denigrate females’46), or 
helping to perpetuate the patriarchal values which make male babies more desirable 
in the first place.47 Some such discussants frame the problem as, at bottom, a conflict 
between individual interests in procreative control and a class interest in 
overcoming disadvantage.48 
But almost all feminist accounts, however they conclude, are alike in recognising 
how strained an example reproductive ‘choice’ sex selection will often be. Some such 
writers that have otherwise defended abortion access on sex equality grounds have 
questioned women’s ability to freely choose sex-based abortions, especially against 
the background of pervasive sex inequality. In a footnote to her well-known article 
‘Sex Equality Under Law’, Catharine MacKinnon highlights the tension between the 
freedom to abort which sex equality seems to demand and permissive policies 
regarding sex-selection: 
 
On the one hand, it is difficult to say why the reason for the abortion decision 
should matter until those who prescribe what matters live with the 
consequences the way the mother does, or until women can make such 
decisions in a context of equality. At the same time, in a context of mass 
abortions of female fetuses, the pressures on women to destroy potential 
female offspring are tremendous and oppressive unless restrictions exist. 
While, under conditions of sex inequality, monitoring women's reasons for 
deciding to abort is worrying, the decision is not a free one, even absent 
governmental intervention, where a male life is valued and a female life is 
not.49 
 
 Doubting whether sex selection is always immoral or inherently sexist, Mary 
Anne Warren supported freedom of choice in the use of sex selection techniques as 
the best legal position, but nevertheless conceded that the question over how free a 
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45!T Powledge, ‘Unnatural Selection: On Choosing Children’s Sex’, in H Holmes et al eds, The Custom 
Made Child? Women-Centered Perspectives (Humana Press, 1981) at 197. See also Warren (n 10) and 
Overall (n 10).!
46!T Powledge, ‘Toward a Moral Policy for Sex Choice’, in Sex Selection of Children (n 35) at 206.  
47 See Chambers (n 28); Overall (n 10) and Holmes 1987 (n 10). 
48 See Cherry (n 44) surmising that ‘the effects of an individual woman’s right to use sex-selective 
abortion goes beyond herself and can augment the oppression that she and other women ultimately 
face’ (at 222). 
49!C. MacKinnon, ‘Sex Equality Under Law’, (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1281, 1317. 
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choice sex selection is will be pertinent for any assessment.50 As she wrote, ‘the more 
powerful the social pressures upon women to have sons, the more room there is to 
doubt that they are really free to choose or reject SSA, and, perhaps, the stronger the 
argument for prohibition’.51 
 Few, I imagine, would doubt the probable influence of social pressure in sex-
selective abortion decisions. Whether it emanates from individuals, a family unit, or 
an entire community that places a higher value on one sex, a decision to abort upon 
revelation of fetal sex is always likely to be partly or wholly informed by external 
persuasions. As I have already noted, the sex-selective abortion that is motivated 
only by personal sexism sounds considerably farfetched, especially given the typical 
costs of abortion. 
 
  Importantly, the influence of social encouragements does not, in and of itself, 
negate any of the section 1 grounds to which a woman might appeal when 
requesting an abortion with fetal-sex-explanations. Far from it: being able to point 
to serious pressure to abort exerted by individuals or groups may well be a crucial 
part of a woman’s explanation as to why her physical or mental health is put at risk 
by the pregnancy, given the sex of the would-be child. However, while social 
pressure to abort does not invalidate possible grounds for abortion, it can raise 
doubts about valid consent to abortion treatment.  
 
The Abortion Act itself does not contain any explicit consent requirement. 
However, it is a general principle of medical law that all treatments performed on 
competent patients must be done so with that patient’s consent in order to be lawful, 
even where that treatment is indubitably in the best interests of the patient – indeed, 
even where it is life-saving.52 In fact, the application of any force to a competent 
patient as part of a medical procedure to which she has not provided consent is, 
legally speaking, an assault.53 As much would therefore be true of a surgically 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50!MA Warren, ‘A Reply to Holmes on Gendercide’, (1987) 1 Bioethics 189. 
51!ibid 195.!!
52!See St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 All ER 673. The UK court addressed the 
question of consent to termination procedures in particular in Re SB [2013] All ER 278. There, the 
question was not whether the patient, who was a minor, failed to give valid consent because of any 
pressure placed on her by others, but whether paranoid thoughts attributable to her bipolar affective 
disorder meant that she lacked the requisite capacity to consent to the procedure. Even though the 
case concerned mental capacity to consent and not the consent-vitiating effect of pressure, Re SB 
nevertheless underscored the general need to obtain valid consent to a termination procedure, unless 
the patient is deemed incapacitous, in which case her judgment would be substituted for a decision in 
her best interests.  
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performed abortion for which valid consent was not obtained.54 And one way a 
patient may fail to give valid consent is if she does not consent through free will.  
 
In Re T (adult), the Court of Appeal directly addressed the possible 
implications of social pressure for a patient’s consent to a treatment procedure.55 In 
that case, a 20 year-old pregnant woman had declined a medically necessary blood 
transfusion under the influence her mother, a practising Jehovah’s Witness. The 
Court determined that the woman’s ability to decide whether to accept the treatment 
had been impaired, partly due to her mother’s pressure, and ordered the transfusion 
to take place. The case was, in a way, an inversion of the pressurised abortion 
scenario, since it concerned compulsion to withhold consent to treatment rather 
than to grant it. However, the Court endorsed the principle that a patient’s consent 
to a particular treatment may not be valid if it is given under pressure or duress 
exerted by another person. 
 
The first thing to say by way of reply to the consent objection is that it does 
not exclude the possibility of some lawful sex-selective abortions. The objection only 
claims that an abortion partly explained by fetal sex will not be lawful if and when 
valid consent is not given. It does not claim that sex-selective abortion is unlawful 
per se, and presumably it would not be so in the case of a pregnant woman who both 
presents a plausible contraindication under section 1 and who gives valid consent. 
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53!More precisely, the infliction of force in the process of non-consensual medical treatment fulfils the 
actus reus, (or, the “conduct”) element of assault, whether or not the assailants possess the requisite 
guilty state of mind, or mens rea, to be guilty of the criminal offence. The absence of consent would 
render the treatment unlawful, however, whether or not it were criminal.  !
54!Whether medical abortive procedures in which the woman eventually self-administers abortifacient 
pills handed over by medical professionals could also be considered an assault where requisite consent 
is lacking is less clear. (In a recent judgment, the High Court held that the Abortion Act’s 
requirement that all abortion ‘treatment’ be carried out on registered premises precluded women 
from taking abortion pills from the clinic to self-administer at home in an early medical abortion. 
However, even when taking place in registered clinics, the final act of ingesting the pills, once handed 
over by healthcare professionals, is still carried out by the pregnant woman herself. See BPAS v  
Secretary of State for Health [2011] EWHC 235 and K Greasley, ‘Medical Abortion and the ‘Golden 
Rule’ of Statutory Interpretation’, (2011) 19 Med L R 314.) However, as long as the prescription and 
self-administration of the pills are regarded (as they have been by the courts) as abortive “treatment”, 
the argument might still be made that the absence of consent renders that treatment unlawful.!!
55![1992] 4 All ER 649.!
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But there are also important questions to be asked about how forceful and 
direct pressure to undergo a medical procedure must be for it to vitiate a patient’s 
consent to that procedure. In Re T, the source of the pressure was a close family 
member who directly exerted influence on her at a time when her ability to form an 
independent judgment was impaired for other reasons, leaving her particularly 
vulnerable to suggestion. Yet, as we know, the influences at issue in sex-selective 
abortion may be altogether more intangible and diffuse than this, and the women 
subjected to them will, for the most part, be entirely capable of weighing the 
considerations and forming a judgment for themselves. It is not clear that pressures 
of these kinds would be enough to invalidate consent to medical procedures other 
than abortion, although they might certainly be as powerful in inducing consent, 
oftentimes more so. Would the Court in Re T have reached the same judgment if the 
woman had refused the transfusion not under personal pressure from her mother, 
but under the weight of the norms and values of a community with which she herself 
identified?   
 
Following MacKinnon’s thinking, some may be inclined to take a more 
expansive view of the conditions of consent to sex-selective abortion, and even to 
raise doubts about the validity of all consent to such a procedure given in a context 
of sex inequality. There may be great difficulty, however, with the consent 
objection’s basic contention that wherever a woman chooses sex-selective abortion 
under social pressure, her consent to the treatment procedure is compromised. 
 
Abortion decisions are never made in a circumstantial void. The advocate of 
the consent objection will therefore need to show why factors that might influence 
or pressurise a woman to choose an abortion after revelation of fetal sex are more 
destructive of consent than a myriad of other uncontrollable circumstances that may 
have a hand in the abortion decision, but are not thought to invalidate consent to 
abortion. We can compare the situation of the pregnant woman under pressure to 
abort because of the fetus’s sex with that of two different women: one who requests 
an abortion because she lacks the financial resources to raise a child, and another 
whose partner tells her that he will end their relationship unless the pregnancy is 
terminated.  
 
In both cases, let us imagine that the woman would have desired to continue 
the pregnancy but for the unfortunate circumstance—the financial constraints, or 
the relationship threat—which motivated her to end it. I expect few people would 
regard these as non-consensual abortions. Valid consent to abortion does not 
demand ideal background circumstances and the absence of pressures of all kinds. 
Indeed, if that were so, we would be hard pushed to find any example of a consensual 
abortion, for reproductive decisions are always made in response to the 
circumstances as they are, often non-ideal. In this respect, abortion choices are like 
all of our choices. Perhaps I choose to become a lawyer because, as it turns out, I am 
better at that than, say, at ballet dancing, a fact that I bemoan. It does not follow 
from this that my lawyerly work is carried out non-consensually. This example 
might sound strange because paid legal work is not generally thought of as the sort 
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of activity one needs to consent to in any formal way – not like a treatment 
procedure. So we might take the more apt example of someone who agrees to 
undergo back surgery to fix a condition that is causing him great pain. It would be 
quite absurd to claim that his consent to the procedure is invalid because he would 
not have given it but for an unwanted circumstance (the back pain). 
7. Consent and Coercion 
This is only to state the obvious point that all of the choices we make are responsive 
to the situation in which we find ourselves, and are not necessarily less autonomous 
for that. The more pointed question regarding abortions requested upon revelation 
of fetal sex is whether they are less consensual than any number of abortion choices 
we readily accept as the free exercise of reproductive autonomy. The proponent of 
the consent objection may suggest that we are mistaken in assimilating the 
pressures motivating sex-selective abortions with those in play in other abortion 
decisions. No doubt, many freely chosen abortions are chosen in response to 
circumstances at least partly outside of the pregnant woman’s control: her 
relationship status, her financial resources; her career development, to name but a 
few. It might be argued, however, that there is something special about the kinds of 
pressures typically at issue in sex-selection. 
 
For one, where the influence comes in the way of pervasive cultural pressure 
to abort females exerted by the values of a pregnant woman’s community, it may be 
thought of a wholly different order from financial dire straits, or plain bad timing. 
Moreover, where the pressure imposed by particular members of the woman’s social 
world is direct and overwhelming enough, it can cross the threshold from mere 
pressure to coercion, and in this respect is set apart from other ‘persuasions’ to 
abortion. That would certainly be true of the extreme case where a woman faces 
domestic violence if she refuses to pursue termination, although coercion need not 
involve threats of physical violence. 
 
In a lengthy analysis of the principal ethical objections to a permissive policy 
on sex-selective abortion, Jeremy Williams suggests that these sorts of attempts to 
distinguish pressure to abort on the basis of sex from other pressures informing 
abortion choices run up against problems.56 The difficulties become apparent when 
comparing cultural imperatives to abort, say, female fetuses, with different social 
imperatives to detect and abort defective fetuses. Williams notes that cultural 
expectations in Western countries now weigh heavily in favour of terminating 
where fetal disability is detected. If cultural pressure of this kind precludes consent 
to a sex-selective abortion, he asks why the same would not be true of selective 
termination on the grounds of disability. It certainly appears that MacKinnon’s 
worry about the freedom of the decision to abort a female fetus in conditions where 
‘a male life is valued and a female life is not’ carries over to the disability context. In 
a social world where the lives of disabled people are not valued equally, are decisions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 J Williams, ‘Sex-Selective Abortion: A Matter of Choice’, (2012) 31 Law and Philosophy 25. 
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to abort defective fetuses not also unfree? This is an implication which proponents of 
the consent objection of sex-selection might be reluctant to accept. 
 
 Sawitri Saharso has suggested that the common assumption that sex 
selection abortion is not a medical intervention that women would request 
voluntarily runs the risk of infantilising women whose reasons for abortion do not 
project prevailing cultural values, by denying their self-authorship of the decision, 
and betrays a double standard in our evaluation of free abortion choice.57 Whereas 
the western woman who seeks an abortion because she is unemployed is realising all 
the value of reproductive autonomy, the immigrant woman who responds to her 
husband, her culture, or her religion is not an autonomous decision-maker. As 
Saharso responds, ‘we could counter-argue that all of us are shaped by our cultures 
and furthermore that not all western women are as fully autonomous’ as we might 
assume.58 Consigning the pressures associated with sex selection to a category of 
their own might do much to encourage the ‘othering’ of ethnic minority cultures, 
along with the mistaken belief that only women from immigrant communities ever 
have reason to make use of sex selection.59 
 
On the coercion question, Williams readily acknowledges a principled distinction 
between choices that are constrained by ‘the application of threats of rights 
violations’ and those in which options are limited through mere circumstance.60 As 
he says: ‘threats of serious wrongful harm are generally regarded as destructive of 
autonomous decision-making in a way that the prospect of being harmed more 
generally need not be’.61 Thus, the woman who is forced to obtain a sex-selective 
abortion to avoid domestic abuse is not properly grouped with the woman who has 
no money to take care of a child. Personal threats of force diminish consent in a way 
that circumstantial pressure does not.62  
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57!Saharso ‘Gender, Culture and Dutch Public Policy’ and ‘Feminist Ethics’ (n 34).!
58!Saharso, ‘Gender, Culture and Dutch Public Policy’ (n 34) 257.!
59 For a discussion of the ways in which the sex selection debate in Canada has entailed the depeiction 
of South Asian communities as primitive and misogynist, see M Deckha, ‘(Not) Reproducing the 
Cultural, Racial and Embodied Other: A 
Feminist Response to Canada's Partial Ban on Sex Selection’, (2007) 16 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ 1, 10- 
11. 
60!Williams (n 57) 141. 
61!ibid. 
62!In this part of the paper, Williams relies on an account of coercion developed by Alan Wertheimer 
in his book, Coercion (Princeton University Press, 1988).  
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Of course, when defined this way, it is obvious that not all women requesting 
abortion after learning of the fetus’s sex will be subject to coercive pressure. 
Williams therefore considers the prescriptive argument that the prospect of coerced 
abortions in some cases might yield paternalistic reasons for a blanket ban on sex-
selective terminations. 63  In other words, he considers a possible prophylactic 
justification for prohibiting sex-selection, grounded in the need to safeguard women 
from terminations in which consent is unquestionably lacking.  
 
A second prophylactic argument of a slightly different kind might also be 
presented in favour of prohibition. Perhaps, by permitting the sex-selection option, 
the state will in fact only place some women in a worse overall position than they 
would be in if the option did not exist at all. This is because coercive pressure to 
abort would be ineffectual, and therefore pointless, if women were not in any case 
able to accede the coercers’ insistence on an abortion. It may be that the very 
availability of sex-selective termination will compromise such women strategically 
by presenting them with an option others may then have reason to coerce them into 
choosing. Of course, this consideration applies to non-coercive pressure as well, 
hence Clare Chambers warns that the availability of sex selection for all will 
jeopardise the autonomy of some women by increasing the pressure on them to 
detect the fetus’s sex and abort if female.64 Conversely: 
If sex selection is not permitted and is not generally available, a pregnant 
woman has an ‘excuse’ for failing to abort a girl – an excuse that is unavailable 
to her if the practice is lawful and relatively common.65 
 
 Williams attempts to counter the prophylactic argument by claiming that 
prohibiting sex-selection on such grounds would be ad hoc.66 After all, women in 
abusive situations can be coerced into getting abortions for all sorts of reasons, not 
only having to do with the fetus’s sex. If the mere potential for undetected coercion 
is sufficient reason to prohibit abortion wherever fetal sex is part of the explanation, 
it is equally good reason, Williams argues, to prohibit all abortion. In short, the 
prophylactic argument proves too much. Thus he concludes that while coercion in 
the abortion context is no doubt a serious concern, the problem is better addressed 
by adopting policies ‘designed to effectively punish abusive spouses and family 
members, empower women within the home, and provide them with feasible exit 
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63!He says (ibid): ‘…standard liberal commitments to individual autonomy and anti-paternalism can 
be compatible with prohibiting certain practices on grounds of ineradicable concerns about people 
being coerced into participating in them, and the harm that would ensue’. 
64 Chambers (n 28). 
65 ibid 330. 
66!The term ‘prophylactic argument’ as applied to these particular claims is my own. 
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options’, a strategy he believes also strikes a better balance between the interests of 
women exposed to coercion and those who choose abortion freely.67 
 
 Williams’s dismissal of the prophylactic argument may be a little too hasty. 
Whilst it is true that domestic coercion can be a feature of abortion decisions in 
which fetal sex is not part of the picture, it does not follow that a legal policy of 
targeting coercion in sex-selection is ad hoc, so long as there is good reason to think 
that abortion as a response to knowledge of fetal sex is uniquely likely to involve 
coercion by some third party or group. If coercive sex-selection is a phenomenon of 
some note, the law may have a consent-based reason to prohibit all sex-selective 
terminations that does not extend to termination of pregnancy in general. Simply 
because the law cannot guard against all coercion in abortion without undue 
compromise to reproductive liberty is not to say it cannot address it in the worst 
places. Further to this, it might be argued that a selectively prohibitive policy 
targeting only those abortions where patient consent is the most precarious is a 
more proportionate protective policy than one which abrogates reproductive rights 
en bloc, just so as to pre-empt any possibility of coercion.  
 
 Still, the claim that outright coercion—as opposed to mere social pressure—
is characteristic of sex-selective abortion strikes me as specious at best. There are all 
manner of reasons that individuals or groups may have for coercing a pregnant 
woman into requesting an abortion (concealment of the sexual intercourse that 
resulted in the pregnancy presumably being very high up on the list), and no reason 
I can think of for suspecting that resort to coercive threats is far more likely when 
the reason pertains to fetal sex. Coercion, remember, marks an extremely advanced 
threshold on the spectrum of influence, where the threat or the force applied is so 
severe that the coerced party is left with no reasonable choice but to comply. Unless 
there is sound reason for believing that such degrees of force are deployed with 
comparatively high incidence where the sex of the future child is the issue, the 
prohibition of sex-selective abortion would seem to come at too high a cost to the 
reproductive freedoms of those who would freely choose abortion for reasons partly 
informed by fetal sex.  
 
 A possible riposte here might point out that even where sex-selective 
abortions are not coercively induced, they are hardly likely to be consensual in the 
most meaningful sense. As MacKinnon reminds us, the decision to abort female 
fetuses in particular ought not to be regarded as entirely free against background 
conditions where ‘male life is valued and female life is not’, let alone where more 
direct forms of pressure and oppression—whether or not they amount to outright 
coercion—engender that decision. Since sex-selective abortion will hardly ever, if 
ever, take place in conditions of true consensuality (if one may put it that way), it 
might be argued that the right to choose terminating procedures which meet the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67!Williams (n 30) 142.!
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standard of free choice only by stopping short of full-fledged coercion is not worth 
protecting in the name of reproductive freedom.  
 
Some would no doubt abjure the assumption that sex selection could never 
amount to genuine choice, even in conditions of patriarchy. As April Cherry argues, 
women are not ‘incapable of making positive choices within the contexts of 
powerlessness and vulnerability’, although these choices will often be “double bind” 
choices in which the chooser faces the dilemma of partaking in her own class 
subordination or being left even worse off.68 In a different vein, Mary Anne Warren 
hypothesised a cluster of relatively harmless and unpressurised sex selection 
scenarios, including the case of prospective parents who may want a daughter after 
having a run of sons (or vice versa), who feel ‘that because of their own personal 
background or circumstances, they would be better parents to a child of one sex than 
the other’, or who might even attempt to ‘resist patriarchy’ by choosing daughters 
rather than sons, or sons, or choosing sons so as to rear them as non-sexist men.69 
More to the point, however, reformulating the consent objection this way 
only resuscitates the earlier problem of distinguishing non-coercive sex-selective 
abortion from a range of other abortion scenarios in terms of consensuality. This, we 
saw, can be extremely difficult. Is the woman who decides on abortion as the best of 
a bad set of options amidst financial hardship exhibiting much greater consensuality 
in her abortion choice than the woman whose ability to cater financially or 
relationally for a new child depends on the sex of that child? Does an existing 
context which belittles the value of women and reduces the opportunities available 
to them diminish consensuality in sex-selective abortion far more so than social 
prejudice against the disabled calls into question the consensuality of abortion for 
fetal disability? If the relevant distinctions cannot be made, we may have to conclude 
that the consent objection is not an adequate justification for prohibiting all abortion 
for which fetal sex is part of the explanation. 
 
8. Conclusion 
There are a number of issues germane to sex-selective abortion which were not 
examined in any detail here. In particular, I have said nothing developed about the 
stark reality that sex selection, as it is practiced globally, is a tool for the 
extermination or prevention of female lives, and the ramifications this has for the 
legal acceptability of sex-selective abortion in any jurisdiction. If we are right to 
speculate that selective abortion is, and indeed, would be, used to select 
overwhelmingly against females, this cannot be inconsequential for the normative 
appraisal of the practice.  
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 However, the pervasive worry that authorising sex-selective abortion will 
meaningfully exacerbate sex inequality must be contextualised to the prevailing 
social values and predicted uptake of the practice in the country in question. Thus 
some discussants have made a point of resisting the tendency to assimilate the sex 
selection issue in Britain and the US with that of India and China, where the 
implications of bearing female children are, on the whole, so drastically different.70 
As Bubeck concludes: 
[I]f sex selection remains relatively little taken up and fails to reach a 
threshold of visibility, its counterproductive effects will be much reduced or 
even negligible, and it would thus be more neutral with respect to gender 
justice and equality.71 
 
 To the extent that abortion with fetal-sex-explanations in Britain does 
threaten to exacerbate the social disadvantage of women and, hence, reinvest in the 
conditions which make female children less desirable, the normative debate will, I 
expect, boil down to how far individual women can be obligated to sacrifice their 
prudential interests in aborting female fetuses for the sake of eliminating sex-
selection as a source of sex inequality, as well as the degree to which a ban on sex 
selection might encroach on reproductive rights more broadly. April Cherry argues 
that the ultimate question for any discussion of sex selection is whether, 
notwithstanding its use to entrench male preference and female subordination, we 
should refrain from prohibiting the practice, in light of the precariousness of 
women’s reproductive rights. 
  
For the so-called ‘liberal feminists’ who conclude that ‘the balancing of harms 
must sway in favour of its foundational principles of the protection of liberty and 
autonomy’,72 the pressing matter is what philosopher Margaret Radin might call the 
‘transitional problem’ of what to do in the interim, non-ideal circumstances where 
refusing the sex selection option only places such women in a “double bind”.73 Some 
might well see the sex selection problem as of a piece with the kind of “double bind” 
problems Radin analyses, such as prostitution and commercial surrogacy, and which, 
she argues, call for tailored transitional policies which dodge the harsh effects of 
prohibition whilst working to reduce the social inequalities that create the 
conditions for exploitation. Those who regard prohibition of sex selection as too 
dangerous to women’s precarious reproductive rights are especially likely to focus 
attention on the wider goal of counteracting the norms and attitudes largely 
responsible for placing some women in the situation whereby their wellbeing is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70!See Cherry (n 44), Kalantry (n 30) and Saharso (n 34).!
71!Bubeck (n 38) 226. 
72!Cherry (n 44) 209.!
73!MJ Radin, “Market Inalienability” (1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849.!
! 32!
threatened by the sex of the future child, including by means of “consciousness 
raising” about son preference.74   
I neglected these matters not because they lack salience, but because I wished 
to focus on the preliminary question about the current legal status of ‘sex-selective 
abortion’ under British law. I have suggested that sex-selective abortion can be 
lawful under the terms of the Abortion Act, and that its lawfulness can be explained 
using the same authorising framework as applies to all legal abortion. This legal 
appraisal of abortion with fetal-sex-explanations is inkeeping with the general tenor 
of the Act which, as has been noted by some, defers heavily to medical authority for 
the authorisation of all abortion, making doctors, rather than pregnant women, the 
ultimate arbiters in termination decisions.75 
I argued, moreover, that reservations about patient consent cannot, without 
more, justify the exclusion of fetal sex from the permissible explanations for 
abortion, and that an exceptional exclusion on grounds of lack of consent would be 
inconsistent with the general permissions of the Abortion Act. Whether an 
exclusion of this kind is still the most appropriate policy to follow when all things 
are considered—including the implications for sex equality—is a question that I do 
not attempt to answer here. 
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